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Abstract: Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) aim at increasing trade flows via reductions on
applied tariffs and the incentives created by the difference between the applied and the most
favoured nation (MFN) tariff, the preference margin. An often omitted element in PTAs evaluation
is the possibility that the wedge between preferential and MFN tariffs may induce a preference rent.
This paper analyses empirically who captures the preference rent by exploiting a unique dataset of
imports in the European Union at a highly disaggregated level (CN-10) linked to information on
the preferential regime used and the tariff applied. In order to remove potential bias and
measurement errors from comparing preferential prices from specific countries and products with
average MFN prices, this paper uses the prices from the same country, product and year. This is
possible since we observe in the database a large number of cases where in the same year a
preferential regime is both utilised and non-utilised. Our main findings suggest that on average an
exporter obtain a larger price margin under a preferential regime than under MFN. However, this
preference rent is only partially appropriated by exporters with a pass-through coefficient from
preference to price margins that oscillates between 0.16 and 0.5.
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1. Introduction
The large increase in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in recent decades has been
widely documented. The European Union (EU) has been a champion in this area, having
signed or being involved in the process of signing PTAs with almost all the countries in the
American and African continent.
1 In addition, the EU grants unilateral preferential access
to its market for a large number of developing countries since the early 1970s through the
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), the Cotonou Agreement (until 2008) and the
Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative for Less Developed Countries (LDCs).
2 Unilateral
preferences, and especially its most important scheme, the GSP, are a central pillar of the
EU‘s strategy towards developing countries.
Preferential access is expected to transmit sustainable development via higher levels of
exports and imports. This can enable countries to develop more efficient industries via
exploiting new relative comparative advantages enhanced by preferential margins,
potentially leading to increases in productivity, competitiveness and diversification. At the
same time, it may also encourage more investment.
While most evaluations of preferential schemes focus on the impact of tariff preferences on
trade flows, very little is known about a potential additional benefit for preference eligible
exporters: the preference rent. Tariff preferences may impact the prices that exporters
receive by introducing a wedge in the border price of that product and effectively creating
a preference rent. The question is, therefore, whether exporters capture these rents and
obtain higher prices.
The objective of this paper is to analyse empirically whether preferential margins in the EU
are transmitted to export prices. In order to do so, we use a highly disaggregated dataset at
the product level (CN-10 digits disaggregation) of imports in the EU for the period of
2002-2008. A unique feature of this dataset is the fact that we can identify export flows by
preferential scheme. This allows us to establish the effective tariff paid for each export
flow (product/country/year), and whether preferences are utilised. This feature is
instrumental for the empirical methodology, since observation of both utilisation and non-
utilisation episodes allow us to compute the price margin.
The main finding of this paper shows that preferential tariff margins are transmitted to
price margins. However, when product and country effects are considered and more
importantly, when we control the potential selection bias from utilisation and non-
utilisation episodes, the estimated pass-through oscillates between 0.15 and 0.5.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the issue of preference rents and
price margins. Section 3 briefly describes the existing evidence. Section 4 describes the
1Excluding the US, Venezuela and Cuba in America and Mauritania in Africa.
2 Within the GSP system, the EU provides preferential access to the EU market to 176 developing countries
in the form of reduced tariffs for their goods. Under EBA, part of the GSP system, 49 LDCs have duty free
quota free access to the EU to all products excluding weapons since 2001. In addition to weapons, banana
and rice were excluded from EBA between 2006 and 2009, and sugar is being transitioned until 2012 with
minimum prices.3
methodology and Section 5 summarises the data. Section 6 analyses empirically the impact
of tariff margins on export prices and price margins. The last section concludes.
2. Preference Margins and Prices
To illustrate the idea of a price rent associated to preferential trade, we can think of exports
for a simple homogenous product x from exporter i to the EU, a competitive market sold at
world prices p
* . A country too small to influence the world price, is entering the EU
paying an MFN tariff at a c.i.f price pxi
cif = p
*/(1+ τ) determined by equilibrium e and
exporting M-M
d. In the short-run, keeping exporters i’s export share constant, if the tariff
is removed there is a gap p
*>pxi
cif (distance ab in the Figure below) which corresponds to
the rent τ pxi




* then there is full transmission of the preference rent to exporter prices and the
exporter appropriates the full amount. However, if pxi
cif remains the same, then importers
absorb all the price rent that then may (or may not) be passed to consumers by lowering
prices. As a result, one important question that arises when assessing preferential schemes
is who appropriates the rent, exporters or importers.
Figure 1: Prices and the Preference Rent
While for the case of homogenous products, the existence of a price margin associated to
preferential tariff margin is illustrated in Figure 1, when imperfect competition and product
differentiation are considered, the final outcome is less clear. Imperfect competition
implies variable mark-ups. For example, under alternative competition frameworks,
changes in tariffs may change exporters’ strategic price decisions. Chang and Winters
(2002) for example, show in a Bertrand monopolistic setting how changes in preferential
treatment in the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) have impacted on exporters’
3 The main assumption here is that the tariff reduction is not passed to the consumer. For example, in a monopolistic competition setting with Dixit-
















prices. In addition, Hellerstein (2006) shows incomplete pass-through from foreign shocks
to import prices in the US, where firms adjust their mark-ups as a pricing to market
strategy.
While market power and the capacity to change mark-ups have been shown to affect export
prices significantly, product differentiation is also an important dimension that determines
export prices. Vertical differentiation and quality differentials between products can be
substantial, especially when working with trade data classifications. For example, Schott
(2004) shows that as a result of quality differentials, there are large differences in unit
values within disaggregated product categories. In this case, different varieties within the
same Harmonized System (HS) product may be competing in different quality segments,
even at higher levels of disaggregation.
Another important dimension related to pricing-to-market that has been stressed by the
literature is the issue of distance. Alchian and Allen (1964) analysed the fact that countries
were more likely to export higher quality exports to more distant markets. Hummels and
Skiba (2004) confirm this hypothesis and show a positive correlation between distance and
export prices.
More recently, models adopting Melitz (2003) heterogeneous firms’ framework have
started to pay more attention to export prices. In the original model, self-selection to export
markets depends on productivity and trade costs, and as a result, the prediction of the
model is that firms exporting to more distant markets have lower prices. However, this is at
odds with recent evidence for the US (Bernard et al. 2007), Mexico (Kugler and Verhoven,
2008), Chile (Hallak and Sivadasan, 2009) and Hungary (Görg et al, 2010). In order to
accommodate the empirical finding fact that export unit values increase with distance,
Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) propose a model that incorporates heterogeneous quality to
the Melitz model.
While the issue of pricing to market and distance refers mainly to the price differential
within exporters of the same country to different export markets, the existing evidence
reinforces the importance of quality differential and variable mark-ups when looking at
export prices.
3. Existing Evidence on Preference Rents
There are a large amount of studies analysing export prices, the law of one price, pricing-
to-market, the degree of pass-through of different shocks to export or import prices (see
Campa and Goldberg, 2006). However, very few studies to our knowledge have analysed
empirically the degree of pass-through of tariff preference margins to export prices and
price margins. Olarreaga and Özden (2005) study the impact of AGOA on export prices of
African exporters of apparel to the US. They find that only a small share of the tariff rent
remained in the hands of African exporters. Özden and Sharma (2004) focus on exports of
apparel to the US under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and find that preferential
exporters capture two thirds of the preference margin, increasing their prices by 9%. Alfieri
and Cirera (2007) find for a group of primary commodities an incomplete pass-through
from tariff margin to price margin ranging between 0.4 and 0.6.5
An important limitation of these studies is the focus on a specific set of commodities. In
addition, the use of counterfactual price - the price that the same variety
4 would pay under
MFN treatment is problematic since this is not observed and needs to be inferred.
4. Methodology
The methodology starts by analysing the degree of pass-through from tariffs to export
prices. If preferential exporters appropriate the preference rent, we should expect that
within a product, tariffs are negatively transmitted to export prices, so other things remain
constant, preferential exporters obtain higher prices when not paying duties.
We estimate a reduced form equation for export prices. In an imperfect competition setting,
prices depend on rival prices (Chang and Winters, 2002), which we proxy as the average
price for that product on the EU market. In addition, export prices depend on productivity
and unit costs, their market power, the tariff paid, the degree of quality differentiation, and
the existing margin (if there is pass-through).
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We parameterise equation (1) in logarithms as:
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Where the log of the export price pijt depends on the average log price for the product on
that year p-jt, the market share of the country on the same year and product Øijt, the tariff
paid, the ratio between the MFN tariff and the effective tariff paid (preference margin), a
country specific quality parameter proxied by the level of GDP per capita and a set of fixed
and time effects. We assume that the country-product (variety) fixed effects λij in (3)
absorb time-invariant specific unit costs cij and productivity, product specific fixed effects
and country specific effects such as distance.
j i ij ij d c      (3)
The previous specification does not address directly the issue of preference rent
transmission to export prices. If preferential margins are fully transmitted we would expect
that an exporter would obtain a higher price exporting under preferential scheme than
under MFN treatment, and the difference being the tariff margin. A problem that arises
when trying to estimate this specification is the choice of counterfactual price. Often, we
only observe when an exporter uses a preference or pays the MFN tariff, but not both
simultaneously. One option is to use the average MFN unit value for that product and
period in the EU market as an approximation to the price that preferential exporters should
receive when exporting under the MFN regime. However, by doing this, we risk
comparing very different varieties with different quality attributes and, therefore, different
prices.
4We use the term variety to define a product originated in a specific country.6
An advantage of our comprehensive dataset is that it includes all products imported by the
EU from 2002 to 2008 disaggregated by country, product and year according to the tariff
paid. This enables us to observe exports from the same country, product and period under
MFN and preferential regimes in the case of exporters utilising and not utilising
preferences in the same period. Under the assumption that quality differentials and price
responses within exports of the same country and product are minimal, especially since for
small countries there may be a single firm exporting the product, comparing preference
utilisation and non-utilisation prices allow us to estimate whether there is any transmission
from tariff preference margins to export price margins without biases.
As a result, we estimate a second specification uses the ratio of unit values when
preferences are utilised vs. when these are not utilised as dependent variable. In this
specification we expect that price ratios levels depend on country market power and
product structure, proxied by market share and GDP per capita, the preference margin,
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While minimising the risk of product differentiation biases, one potential problem of this
approach is the fact that by using only those observations where we observe in the same
country/product/period, both preference utilisation and non-utilisation, we effectively carry
out a sample selection. We exclude those observations not eligible for preferential
treatment, and for those eligible, we only use those cases where both utilisation and non-
utilisation of preferences are observed and the price ratio can be computed. Thus, if some
of the determinants of this selection also explains the price ratio, such as income per capita
of exporter, then OLS estimates of the price margin equation are biased. In order to correct
this potential bias we need to use a Heckman (1979) procedure with a selection equation
able to control for the different alternative regimes. This can be done by employing a
multinomial logit framework for selection, where we explain discrete outcomes such as
non-eligibility, utilisation, non-utilisation and both utilisation and non-utilisation
happening in the same period.
5. The Data
We use import data at the country level and disaggregated at the 10 digits level of
Combined Nomenclature(CN-10) supplied by the EC. Trade flows are aggregated each
year per country, product and tariff regime. The tariff regimes are: MFN; GSP, GSP+ or
EBA and other preferential regime (Cotonou and other FTAs); tariff suspension, and; MFN
under quota or preferential under quota. In around 80% of the observations we only
observe one tariff regime, but on the remaining cases we may observe two regimes (more
than 2 in only 1% of observations). We match import data observations with tariff data
from TARIC.
5
5 Some ad valorem conversions have not been possible when there was the need for reference prices. The
total loss of observations represents around 5% of the value of imports.7
Observations with trade flows below €500 are dropped, since they do not represent any
meaningful trade. We use unit values as proxy for prices. Any errors on the inputted values
or quantities reported are likely to generate noisy unit values. For this reason we apply the
Hadi (1992) filter for outliers, for each product and year. After cleaning the dataset we
found around 1.5 million observations with unit value and tariff data available, for imports
to the EU from 219 countries/territories during the period 2002-2008. In total we have
more than 19,000 products, since a significant number of product codes are added during
the period and some new products imported. For around 4,000 of these products we
observe less than 10 export flows for the whole period.
Tariff Margins
Despite the large amount of countries eligible for preferences, the low product coverage,
stringent rules of origin (RoO), small tariff margins and resultant low degree of preference
utilisation have raised concerns about the de facto importance of preferences driving trade
flows. Since our database allow us to distinguish import flows in the EU according to the
tariff paid, we can identify the effective tariff margin experienced by each flow.
We define the tariff margin as the log ratio between the MFN tariff for that product and
year, and the tariff paid by that country, product and period, equation (5). Adding tariff
data to our dataset implies the conversion from non-ad valorem to ad valorem tariffs. Due
to the existence of seasonal duties we observe for a very small fraction of flows (1.34%),
mainly in agriculture, a negative margin, where effective tariffs paid were larger than
average MFN tariffs. For most flows, however, tariff margins are zero. 67% of trade flows
to the EU market from 2002 to 2008 in our dataset have zero MFN rates, and only 31.7%
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Decomposing positive margin flows and eliminating extreme values arising from
averaging seasonal tariffs, indicate that a large number of products with positive margins,
experience margins equivalent to a tariff difference below 4%. The average tariff margin
for the whole sample is equivalent to a tariff difference of 1.8%, while the average tariff
margin for flows with positive margins (and excluding 5% extreme values) is equivalent to
around 5%.
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Table 1 shows the 10 countries with relatively large average tariff difference between the
tariff effectively paid and the MFN tariff. The list is dominated by LDC countries, mainly
from Africa.
Table 1 Countries with Larger Average Tariff Margin
Country
Average tariff difference











Source: Author’s own calculations from TARIC
Export Prices
A close look at the data shows the existence of very large variations within the same
narrowly defined CN-10 digits product. In order to compare price variation across
products, for each product and year we compute the coefficient of variation of unit values
equation (6): the estimated standard deviation normalised by the estimated mean. Figure 3
shows the probability distribution function of the coefficient of variation for all product-
year from 2002 to 2008 under four different classifications based on Rauch’s conservative
classification (Rauch, 1999): all products, homogenous products, differentiated products











Full sample 84666 0.6787 0.3792 1.3245 6.0645
Homogenous products 6057 0.5461 0.3997 1.5412 6.3788
Differentiated products 46122 0.7001 0.3293 1.5105 7.2522
Reference price products 26526 0.6577 0.4450 1.2617 4.9415
Source: Author’s own calculations from COMEXT9
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The first diagram in Figure 3, where all the products are included show very large
variations of unit values that cannot be explained by differences in tariff access in the EU
market. On average, the standard deviation of unit values within product in the same year
is 68% times the estimated mean. All four plots show a long tail on the right hand side
indicating the presence of a few products with extremely large variation of unit values. As
expected, homogenous and reference price products show lower variation within CN-10
and their distribution are more skewed to the left.
Surprisingly, however, the mean of the coefficient of variation for reference price products
is similar to the full sample and the standard deviation is large, indicating considerable
variation of unit values within reference price products. These results are clearly indicative
of the problems arising with quality, and vertical differentiation in general, within product
categories.
Schott (2004) suggests that richer countries tend to obtain higher export prices.
Furthermore, new evidence at the firm level shows that more productive firms tend also to
obtain higher prices. As a result, we explore the correlation between export prices and
income per capita. Figure 4 shows the probability distribution function of all the
correlation coefficients estimated for each individual product at CN-10 with more than 10
observations during the period 2002-2008.
6 Surprisingly, the results suggest low
correlation between prices and GDP per capita for most products, with an average
correlation coefficient of 0.17. Since the dataset contains all the universe of products,
including homogenous and reference price products, we look at the correlations when
including only differentiated products according to Rauch’s classification. Price
differentiation is more likely when products are differentiated. However, we obtain a
similar correlation pattern with a larger but similar average low correlation of 0.19.
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Price Ratios for Preferential and Non-preferential Exporters
The main interest of the paper is to understand the degree of pass-through from tariff to
price margins. The initial question is, therefore whether this price margin exists and, other
things constant, exporters under preferential schemes receive higher prices than exporters
under MFN.
We compute for each product and year the average unit value across exporters under
preference and exporters under the MFN regime, for products where some exporter is
6This is a total of 15,433 products.11
eligible for preferential treatment (a total of more than 50,000 cases). This allows us to












The distribution has a long right hand side tail, for this reason we drop those observations
above the 99% percentile. Figure 5 plots the probability distribution function for this
percentage difference. The average value is a positive 25%, however, this result is largely
affected by the long right hand side tail since more than 62% of the observations have
negative percentage differences. This implies that most of the product/year average prices
under MFN are larger than under the preferential scheme.
Figure 5 Probability density function for unit value percentage differences between
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The previous analysis shows that existing large differences between unit values within the
same product may distort the use of average prices between countries. In addition, many
preferential exports enjoy minimal tariff margins. For this reason, and in order to minimise
any difference related to other factors, we compute the log price ratio for the periods where
both preference utilisation and non-utilisation are observed for the same country and year.
Figure 6 plots the probability distribution function of this ratio. A value of zero
corresponds to the case when both prices are equal. The probability distribution function
(pdf) is slightly skewed to the right, however, the average value for the log ratio of -0.092
indicating higher probability that prices when preferences are non-utilised are larger than
preferential prices. This is reflected in a longer tail to the right of the distribution. In
general, however, this univariate analysis indicates similar recurrence of cases where prices
under utilisation are both smaller (55%) and larger (45%) than non-utilisation prices.12






















The main problem with univariate analysis is the lack of control for other factors that may
explain prices, such as market power or the type of product. As a result, identification of
the true impact of the tariff margin on prices requires control of these other factors and
estimation of reduced form equations as in (3) and (4).
6. Econometric Analysis
Export Prices
We start by estimating equation (2) for export prices in order to analyse the degree of pass-
through from tariffs to export prices. The main challenge of the estimations is how to deal
with the three way error component in (2) and (3). We then estimate the reduced form
equation by OLS with robust standard errors clustered for each variety. The results of
different specifications are reported in Table 3 columns (1) to (3). Richer and more distant
countries, and countries with larger market share tend to have higher export prices. In
addition, countries show a positive response to increases in average prices. Regarding the
main variable of interest, the tariff pass-through, the estimates suggest a large positive
pass-through between 0.5 and 0.7. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 add the tariff margin to
the specification and obtain roughly full pass-through from tariff to price margins. Finally,
column (3) finds a positive impact of average distance on prices.
The main problem with OLS estimates is the fact that they are biased if λij is correlated
with the dependent variables. In order to correct for this potential correlation we first use
variety (product country pair) fixed effects (columns (4) and (5)). The significant change in
the coefficients indicates the existence of correlation between the λij and the dependent
variables. The coefficients show the same expected sign but lower magnitude. However,
interestingly now the pass-through from tariffs to export prices is reduced significantly and
when we add the margin becomes negative. A negative pass-through is consistent with the
existence of a price margin for preferential exporters. However, in this case we should
expect a positive pass-through from the margin.13
Table 3 Export Price Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 FE1 FE2 FELSDV1 FELSDV2
Share 0.0058*** 0.0049*** 0.0051*** 0.0399*** 0.0400*** 0.0127*** 0.0127***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Average
price
0.9329*** 0.9345*** 0.9321*** 0.4714*** 0.4720*** 0.6760*** 0.6750***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0020)






(0.0172) (0.0196) (0.0193) (0.0177) (0.0493) (0.0183) (0.0537)




(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0132) (0.0132)




(0.0243) (0.0255) (0.0513) (0.0558)
Distance 0.0600***
(0.0012)



















































































(0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0127) (0.1028) (0.1032)
Obs. 1489595 1481623 1481524 1489595 1481623
R-squared 0.8235 0.8235 0.8242 0.7726 0.7721
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
In order to further control for the three way error term, we use the fixed-effects least square
dummy variables (FELSDV) methodology proposed by Andrews et al. (2006). The main
assumption is to decompose λij in product fixed effects and country dummies, and to
assume one error term εijt that is N~(0,σ
2) as in equation (8):
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Due to the computational difficulties and the large number of parameters to estimate we
use the STATA command FELSDV developed by Cornelissen (2008). The results are
reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table 3. We reject the hypothesis that both product and
country effects are zero. The results again provide a negative and low pass-through from
tariffs, as well as margins.
A final robustness check is related to the potential simultaneity between average prices and
export prices, especially in products with a low number of exporters. We re-estimate the
same specifications but using the lagged average price value as instrument. The results are
reported in Table 4 and are very similar to those in Table 3, but with a reduction on the
pass-through from tariffs to prices. Again, the pass-through becomes negative when we
control for variety, country and product fixed effects.
Price Margins
In order to properly identify the degree of pass-through from preferential margins to prices,
we estimate equation (4) using the price ratios for those country/product/years where we
observe both utilisation and non-utilisation of preferences. Rather than considering each
export flow according to the tariff regime paid, we collapse the sample by each
product/exporter/year flow. We then define the price ratio as the logarithm of the unit value
of product i from exporter j and year t under preferential regime divided by the unit value

















For a total of 247,923 cases, we are able to calculate the price ratio. Table 5 shows the
results from the estimates. Columns (1) and (2) show OLS estimates with clustered errors
for each country/product pair. Countries with larger market shares and higher income per
capita and, therefore, with higher bargaining power, tend to obtain higher price margins. In
addition, the main variable of interest - the tariff margin -is fully transmitted to the price
ratio with a pass-through coefficient of around 1. The specification in column (2) attempts
to further control for market structure issues by adding a dummy with value 1 according to
whether the product is differentiated in terms of Rauch’s (1999) classification, and the
average import demand elasticity in the EU as calculated by Kee et al. (2009) at HS-6
level. The results show that price ratios tend to be larger for differentiated products, with
more room, for price differentiation, and are lower for more demand elastic goods,
although the last coefficient is only significant at 5% level. We also use an interactive
dummy to measure whether there is a differential impact of the tariff margin for those
flows that used the GSP or EBA regime vs. those using the Cotonou Agreement or any
other FTAs. The coefficient associated to the interactive dummy is negative, suggesting a
lower pass-through for the GSP/EBA regime.15
Table 4 Export Price Specification Lagged Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 FE1 FE2 FELSDV1 FELSDV2
Share 0.0018*** 0.0013** 0.0014** 0.0329*** 0.0329*** 0.0081*** 0.0082***


























































(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0024) (0.0053) (0.0068) (0.0068)






(0.0084) (0.0087) (0.0151) (0.1358) (0.1376)
Observations 1182018 1176777 1176693 1182018 1176777
R-squared 0.7943 0.7945 0.7951 0.7843 0.7840
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.0516
Table 5 Export Price Ratio Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS1 OLS2 FE1 FE2 FELSDV FELSDV
Share 0.0067*** 0.0068*** 0.0097*** 0.0098*** 0.0040*** 0.0040***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0009) (0.0009)
GDP capita 0.0435*** 0.0397*** -0.0512 -0.0501 0.0257*** 0.0265
(0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0471) (0.0471) (0.0415) (0.0416)
Tariff margin 1.0141*** 1.1502*** 0.8141*** 0.8743*** 0.1485*** 0.1674*
(0.0389) (0.0439) (0.1533) (0.1605) (0.0749) (0.0774)




Import demand elasticity -0.0008*
(0.0004)
2003 0.0262*** 0.0265*** 0.0295*** 0.0294*** 0.0241*** 0.0241***
(0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0056)
2004 0.0194*** 0.0196*** 0.0296*** 0.0294*** 0.0213*** 0.0212**
(0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0069)
2005 0.0309*** 0.0311*** 0.0355*** 0.0352*** 0.0274*** 0.0272**
(0.0059) (0.0062) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0085) (0.0085)
2006 0.0282*** 0.0287*** 0.0245* 0.0241* 0.0135*** 0.0133
(0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0100) (0.0100)
2007 0.0430*** 0.0440*** 0.0488*** 0.0484*** 0.0333*** 0.0331**
(0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0116) (0.0116)
2008 0.0546*** 0.0550*** 0.0671*** 0.0667*** 0.0472*** 0.0470***
(0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0129) (0.0129)
Constant -0.4895*** -0.4765*** 0.2920 0.2843
(0.0148) (0.0175) (0.3747) (0.3748)
Observations 244442 222061 244442 244442 244442 222061
R-squared 0.0088 0.0095 0.0009 0.0009
Number of variety 98153 98153
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
In order to control for variety specific elements, specifications in columns (3) to (6) use
variety fixed effects and FELSDV with both product and exporter dummies. For the fixed
effects specification, the results are similar, although GDP per capita becomes statistically
not significant. The estimated tariff margin pass-through is still large and positive (0.8) for
the FE specifications. On the other hand the FELSDV specification reduces considerably
the pass-through to 0.15. In addition, once controlled for variety, product and country
specific elements, the interactive tariff margin GSP/EBA dummy coefficient becomes
statistically not significant. The results still show a very low R
2, indicating lack of
explanatory power for price ratio variations. This is probably the result of not having
information on variety costs, which is likely to be the main determinant of prices and their
variation across varieties.
The estimates above indicate the average transmission from tariff to price margins. In order
to analyse product dynamics we re-estimate equation (4) product by product for those
products with more than 50 observations during the sample period, controlling for country
fixed effects and year dummies. This implies re-estimating equation (4) for 1,425 products.
However, only 634 products have any variation in the tariff margin that allows estimating
the tariff margin coefficient. Figure 7 shows the probability distribution function for the
estimated coefficients excluding the 1% extreme values at both tails. The average pass-17
through excluding 1% outliers is 1.4. However, this result is dominated by the presence of
long symmetric tails.
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We also re-estimate equation (4) correcting for product fixed effects for each country with
data available and more than 50 observations. Table 6 shows the estimated coefficient for
the ten countries with larger and smaller estimated pass-through.





Panama -273.40 Jordan 5.88
Honduras -106.90 Macao 6.50
Sierra Leone -78.60 Iran 7.30
El Salvador -75.95 Belarus 9.01
Gambia -22.58 Paraguay 10.33
Uruguay -18.32 Ukraine 10.78
Moldova -17.94 Fiji 12.90
Nepal -17.51 Yemen 13.40
Gabon -16.13 Nicaragua 78.90
Senegal -15.09 Oman 227.00
Source: Author’s own estimates
As suggested above, the results for the price ratio specification are likely to experience
sample selection bias from reducing our sample to those observations where both
utilisation and non-utilisation are observed. For this reason, we need to implement a
selection procedure. We follow Bourguignon et al. (2007) and estimate a multinomial
Logit model for the different utilisation alternatives. Concretely, we estimate the following
equation, where Yi is a discrete variable with value 0 to 3 according to whether a trade flow
is only MFN eligible (regime 0), preferences are fully utilised (regime 1), preferences are
non-utilised (regime 2), or both (regime 3), which is the regime where the price ratio can
be calculated. The reason to consider regime 3 as a separate regime is the need to generate
specific correction for selectivity terms for this regime.
3 , 2 , 1 , 0
*    forY x Y ijt ijt ijt   (10)18
ijt ijt ijt u x P   
*
3
*   ifY P P
The interpretation of the estimated coefficients needs to be understood as the impact of
each variable with respect to the baseline category, MFN eligibility. In order to explain the
different utilisation regimes, we use the tariff paid, the MFN tariff for that product and
period, an index that measures RoO rigidity (Cadot el al. 2006), a dummy variable with
value one if the good is homogenous according to Rauch’s classification and GDP per
capita.
The estimated coefficients need to be interpreted carefully due to the specific split of tariff
regimes. This is confirmed by the Hausman test for Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) (Hausman, 1978) which indicate large differences when omitting regime
1, and, therefore, the fact that different regimes may not be independent. It is likely that a
nested structure considering eligibility and preference utilisation separately would be more
appropriate for the different alternatives. Nevertheless, this would not allow us to compute
the specific selection terms, which are the objective of this first stage.
Table 7 shows the average marginal effects of the multinomial Logit estimates. Fixed
effects are not defined for multinomial Logit and selection. For this reason, we estimate the
model considering only time dummies and not variety effects. Lower paid tariffs and
higher MFN tariffs (higher tariff margins) increase the probability of preference eligibility,
used or not used, vis-à-vis MFN eligibility. Clearly, all products without preferential access
imply zero margins. Homogenous goods according to Rauch’s classification are less likely
to being eligible for preferences. Income per capita reduces both, preference eligibility and
utilisation, since richer countries are less likely to receive preferences. Interestingly,
however, it increases the likelihood of both utilisation and non-utilisation occurring vis-à-
vis MFN eligibility. Finally, stringent RoOs reduce the probability of utilisation and
increase the probability of non-utilisation vis-à-vis MFN eligibility. These coefficients are
difficult to interpret, since we would expect the opposite sign. However, they should be
compared with the odds of being in the MFN regime. It is likely that RoOs are more
stringent on those product lines where there is more preference use than on mainly MFN
eligible lines.
The selection model allows us to compute the different selection terms. We use
Bourguignon et al. (2007) methodology and estimate the price ratio equation correcting for
selection using the command selmlog available in STATA and developed by the authors.
Column (1) estimates Dubin-McFadden (1984) correction method, column (2) relaxes the
assumption all correlation coefficients sum-up to zero, and column (3) estimates the variant
version of Dubin-McFadden (1984) suggested by Bourguignon et al. (2007).
Table 8 shows the results of the estimates. The selection coefficients are statistically
significant indicating the impact of unobserved components and the fact that OLS
estimates are inconsistent. This is translated in a reduction in the tariff margin pass-
through, which is halved to 0.37-0.5. The selection terms mi for regimes i=0,1,2,3 are
mostly negative, indicating price ratios are downward biases because observations with
better unobservable characteristics are less likely to be in the utilisation and non-utilisation
regime.19
Table 7 Multinomial Logit for Selection. Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3)
utilisation Non-utilisation Both utilisation and non-
utilisation
Tariff -0.6723*** -0.0501*** -0.0466***
(0.1829) (0.0021) (0.0053)
MFN tariff 1.5804*** 0.0067 0.2607***
(0.1830) (0.0091) (0.0098)
GDP capita -0.0431*** -0.0024*** 0.0044***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
RoO index 0.0038*** -0. 0032*** 0.0018***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
homogenous -0.0469*** -0.0166*** -0.0145***
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0016)
2003 -0.0030** -0.0013 0.0061***
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0010)
2004 -0.0146*** 0.0086*** -0.0113***
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010)
2005 -0.0488*** 0.0228*** -0.0249***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
2006 -0.0445*** 0.0269*** -0.0307***
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010)
2007 -0.0410*** 0.0188*** -0.0228***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)





*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
In conclusion, the estimates suggest that preference margins are transmitted to exporters
who capture part of the preference rent. However, the degree of pass-through is
significantly reduced when we control for potential sample selection.
7. Conclusions
This paper analyses empirically the possibility of an additional benefit of preferential trade
regimes on exporters, the appropriation of tariff preference rents induced by preference
margins. We find in line with the literature that there is a significant number of cases where
preferences are not utilised and eligible export flows for preferences pay the full MFN
tariff. We also observe very large differences within prices of the same CN-10 digits
product classification. On average, the standard deviation of unit values within product in
the same year is 68% of the estimated mean. Regarding preference margins, we find that
67% of trade flows to the EU market from 2002 to 2008 are done at zero MFN rates (no
preference margin), and only 31.7% of the flows enjoyed a positive preference margin on
average. From these flows with positive margin, once excluded outliers, the average is
equivalent to around 5% tariff difference.
Despite large differences in prices within product categories we estimate the impact of
tariffs on export prices. We find that once we control for variety effects, tariffs paid tend to
be negatively correlated with export prices, which is consistent with a positive price
margin.20
Table 8 Export Price Ratio Specification with Multinomial Selection
(1) (2) (3)
Dubin Dubin2 Bourguignon
GDP capita 0.0665*** 0.0730*** 0.0764***
0.0021) 0.0023) 0.0025)
Market share 0.0049*** 0.0051*** 0.0048***
0.0007) 0.0007) 0.0008)
Preference margin 0.3674*** 0.4850*** 0.5096***
0.0493) 0.0521) 0.0521)
2003 0.0420*** 0.0489*** 0.0549***
0.0057) 0.0057) 0.0062)
2004 -0.0081 -0.0242** -0.0292***
0.0068) 0.0071) 0.0076)
2005 -0.0261** -0.0617*** -0.0743***
0.0101) 0.0113) 0.0124)
2006 -0.0469*** -0.0896*** -0.1053***
0.0118) 0.0133) 0.0147)
2007 -0.0136 -0.0453*** -0.0575***
0.0096) 0.0106) 0.0117)
2008 -0.0098 -0.0462*** -0.0597***
0.0106) 0.0118) 0.0129)
m0 0.8980*** -0.4255* -2.1405***
0.1168) 0.2217) 0.2907)
m1 -0.5786*** -1.0315*** -1.9509***
0.0448) 0.0785) 0.1431)




Constant -1.1971*** -1.7968*** -1.9857***
0.0931) 0.1263) 0.1333)
Sigma2 1.0954 3.1236 2.9443
rho0 1.1004 -0.3088 -1.2475
rho1 -0.7091 -0.7486 -1.1370
rho2 -0.6438 -1.0398 -1.4544
rho3 0.0651 -0.1467
Observations 237210 237210 228687
R2 0.0117 0.0119 0.012
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
We finally estimate a direct specification linking tariff margins with price margins. We
find a consistent positive full pass-through from tariff to price margins. This pass-through,
however, is substantially reduced when we consider variety effects and when we control
for potential sample selection. The pass-through is estimated to a range between 0.16 and
0.5, depending on whether product and country effects are considered or selection. A
common pattern of the estimates is the low R
2, likely the result of the lack of product and
country specific cost data.
In conclusion, the main findings of the paper show that preference margins induce a
preference rent, which is partly appropriated by preferential exporters.21
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